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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
THOMAS M. VIGIL,
:

Case No. 940614-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from three convictions of theft by
deception, second and third degree felonies, in a criminal case.
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (f) provides this Court's jurisdiction
over this case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire?
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court's
performance of jury voir dire with the abuse of discretion
standard of review.
App. 1992).

State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah

"Whether a trial court abused its discretion in

conducting voir dire depends on whether,

considering the

totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate
opportunity to acquire the information necessary to evaluate

[prospective] jurors. 7 "

Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the

Court).
The issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's
pre-submitted voir dire questions, and objection to the trial
court's failures to ask requested questions.

(R. 709, 710, 718,

719, 725).
2. Did the trial court give the jury an erroneous
instruction?
In reviewing this question on appeal, the Court reviews
it as a question of law, for correctness.
835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992).

State v. Ontiveros,

The Court reviews "jury

instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case."

Id. (citation omitted).

This issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's
objections.

(R. 1164-1171).

3. Did the trial court err in blocking the presentation
of defense evidence and in denying jury instructions requested by
the defense?
The standard of review on the jury instruction aspect
of this issue is a correction of error standard of review.
Ontiveros, supra.

The standard of review on the evidence aspect

of this issue is more deferential.
abuse of discretion.

The record must show a clear

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah

1994) .

2

The issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's
objections to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, and
by trial counsel's efforts to present the evidence.

(R. 1151-

1158; 1164-1171) .
4. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective in
failing to request proper defense instructions, and did the trial
court commit plain error in failing to give these instructions?
Because the trial court was not presented the
ineffective assistance issue, this Court must determine whether
trial counsel was ineffective as a matter of law.

Salt Lake City

v. Grotespas, 874 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1994).

Review of

trial counsel's performance is to be "'highly deferential'" and
is to avoid "'distorting effects of hindsight.'"

id. (citations

omitted).
In assessing the plain error question, this Court
should determine whether the errors below were both obvious and
harmful.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied,

110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).

This Court has the discretion to dispense

with the obviousness requirement where the error was harmful in
retrospect, but may not have been readily apparent to the trial
court and counsel.

Id., 773 P.2d at 3 5 and n.8.

See also State

v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)(applying plain error
standard to failure to given jury instructions sua sponte).
The issue was not raised below.

3

5. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the
statutes governing this case, in concluding that the facts
alleged here could constitute theft by deception?
"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error."

State

v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).
The issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's
motions to quash the bindover orders and motions to dismiss the
case.

(R. 19-69; 183-233; 560; 1052-1053).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions

are included in Appendix 1 to this brief:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 26
Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1
United States Constitution, Article VI
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-3 04
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-402
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-405
Utah Code Ann. section 76-7-203
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 01
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 02
Utah Rule of Evidence 403.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of Utah charged Mr. Vigil in district court
case number 931901607 with two counts of theft by deception
involving Rex Bushman and Frank Elizondo (R. 170-172), and in
4

district court case number 931901605 with one count of second
degree felony theft by deception involving Paul Halliday (R. 7 ) .
Roger K. Scowcroft of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
was appointed to represent Mr. Vigil (R. 13; 175).
Magistrate Hutchings bound the cases over to district
court on October 12, 1993 (R. 2; 163). At his district court
arraignment on October 25, 1993, before Judge Medley, Mr. Vigil
entered pleas of not guilty to all charges (R. 17; 181). Mr.
Vigil moved to quash the bindover orders (R. 19-69; 183-233;
560), and the district court denied the motions (R. 82; 261,
582) .
Mr. Vigil moved to sever the two counts in district
court case number 931901607 (R. 235-239; 560-566).

The State

opposed this motion (R. 252-260), and moved to join both cases
against Mr. Vigil in a trial on similar cases filed against Mr.
Vigil's wife, Tonya (R. 75-81; 245-251).

The trial court joined

all counts and cases together for one trial (R. 261, 585-586).
The jury convicted Mr. Vigil as he was charged (R. 3 93,
394, 397).
Judge Medley sentenced Mr. Vigil to serve three
concurrent terms of zero to five, one to fifteen and one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison on September 19, 1994 (R.
149; 419, 420). Mr. Vigil filed his amended notice of appeal on
October 7, 1994 (R. 151). He moved Judge Medley to grant a
certificate of probable cause (R. 127-148; 413-418), but the
judge denied the motion (R. 150; 421; 433-435).
5

After the notice of appeal was filed, a conflict of
interest caused the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to
withdraw as counsel for Mr. Vigil, and Patrick L. Anderson now
represents Mr. Vigil on appeal.
This Court consolidated the appeals of the cases, which
were tried together in the district court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
DEFENSE CASE
Thomas and Tonya Vigil were married and living with
five children in their home in the summer of 1992. Tonya went to
her physician for a tubal ligation and discovered that she was
pregnant.

Because the Vigils were financially destitute, they

decided to give up the expected child for adoption.

The Vigils

made arrangements to give up the unborn baby for adoption to
three separate families.

During the course of the transactions,

the prospective adoptive parents gave the Vigils money for
expenses.

The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to

the Elizondo couple because the Vigils had disagreements and
difficulties with the attorney representing the Elizondos.

The

Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to the Bushman
couple because of difficulties with Mr. Bushman, mainly because
Mr. Bushman told them that he had decided not to adopt the child
himself, but would find another unspecified adoptive family.

The

Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to the Hallidays
because after the child was born, they could not part with her.
The Vigils kept their baby.

They did not inform any of the
6

couples when the child was born, and did not inform any of the
couples that they were receiving expense money from other
couples.

(R. 1062-1151).

STATE'S CASE
COUNT I
Rex Bushman was a Salt Lake adoption attorney whom
Tonya Vigil called to arrange the adoption.

When the Vigils met

with him in person on February 28, 1993, he drafted and they
signed a document indicating that he would find a family to adopt
their baby.

He asked the Vigils if his own family might adopt

their child, and they agreed.
expenses and they agreed.

He offered to pay for medical

He drafted and they signed an

agreement for the payment of maternity expenses on March 5, 1993.
The agreement indicated that they would return the expense money
in the event that the adoption did not go through.

He also

drafted and they signed a form purporting to waive any conflict
of interest stemming from his dual roles as their attorney and a
prospective parent. (R. 754-761).
On approximately March 3, 1993, Mr. Vigil called Mr.
Bushman twice, indicating the Vigils' need for living expenses of
approximately $1,500.

Mr. Bushman had agreed to pay $500 in

living expenses, and then agreed in writing to pay them $1,000
after their consent to the adoption was final.

Mr. Bushman wrote

a check to Jim Corbett for $3 90 for their rent, and a check to
Mrs. Vigil for $110.

(R. 761-766).
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Mr. Bushman maintained contact with the Vigils, but had
decided not to adopt the Vigil baby.

Sometime after March 19,

1993, Mrs. Vigil told him the adoption was still on.

He called

again later and found that the telephone had been disconnected,
and he then called the police.

The adoption never went through,

and the Vigils never repaid Mr. Bushman the $500.

(R. 766-769).

Mr. Bushman testified that he would not have paid the
Vigils $500 if he had not intended to obtain the baby.

When

asked if he considered the money a gift or charitable donation,
he indicated that he found that idea "preposterous."

He also

testified that he would not have given the Vigils the $500 if he
had known that other people were paying the Vigils in
anticipation of adopting the baby.

(R. 769).

COUNT II
Fransisco Elizondo was attempting to adopt a child
through an attorney named John Giffen, beginning in 1992. His
legal contacts informed him that the Vigils had indicated an
interest in having him adopt their child, so he called Mrs. Vigil
on the telephone in October of 1992, when she was living with her
mother.

After further telephone contact with Mrs. Vigil, Mr.

Elizondo arranged to pay $500 a month for her pregnancy expenses
through Mr. Giffen's office.

He paid $1,200 to get Mrs. Vigil

into an apartment in November of 1992, and paid a total of
$4,300.

John Giffen testified that the Vigils received about

$5,300.

Elizondo and his wife flew to Salt Lake City from their

home in California to visit the Vigils in February.
8

Mrs. Vigil

told him the baby was due in March, and forms she filled out for
Mr. Giffen specified March 27, 1993, as the due date.

(R. 879-

895; 927; 975-976). Later in February, Thomas Vigil called Mr.
Elizondo and asked him to change attorneys because Mr. Vigil was
not happy with John Giffen.

The Vigils did not like the way the

money was being managed through the trust, and wanted it to come
directly to Mr. Vigil.
had

John Giffen confirmed that Mr. Vigil had

disagreements with him because Mr. Vigil wanted more money

and wanted the money sent to him.

There was also a problem

because Mr. Giffen's assistant did not obtain medication
necessary to treat Mrs. Vigil's yeast infection.

(R. 889; 905-

907; 914; 918; 954-955; 958; 1010).
Mr. Elizondo maintained contact with the Vigils in
March of 1993, until their telephone was disconnected.

He later

learned through Mr. Giffen's assistant that the Vigils had had
the baby on March 18, 1993, and had decided to keep her. (R. 895897, 908).
Mr. Elizondo testified that he knew that there was no
guarantee that the adoption would go through, that he did not
consider the money he paid to be a charitable contribution, that
he would not have paid them had he known that others were paying
them at the same time, and that he never got any money back from
the Vigils.

(R. 897-898; 913).

He had a civil lawsuit pending against the Vigils,
which was filed by Paul Halliday (R. 921).
COUNT III
9

Paul Halliday and his wife, Vicky Halliday, were
working through an attorney, Marilyn Fineshriber, in an effort to
adopt a child, in March of 1993.

Mrs. Vigil had originally

contacted their attorney about the prospective adoption on March
3, or March 4, and the Vigils met with the attorney on March 7,
or March 8 of 1993.

Mrs. Vigil said the prospective due date for

the birth of the child was August 28, 1993.

Mr. Halliday made

arrangements to pay $900 in expenses to the Vigils on March 12,
1993, after Mrs. Vigil told the attorney on March 7, 1993, that
the Vigils were about to be evicted, and another $600 on March 25
or 26, 1993, in response to Mr. Vigil's call to the attorney
indicating that the Vigils' telephone had been disconnected and
that they needed money to pay their utilities.

The receipts from

the checks to the Vigils from the law firm indicate that the
payments were charitable donations.

Mrs. Vigil told the attorney

on March 23, 1993, that the Vigils were planning to go through
with the adoption.

The Hallidays did not adopt the Vigil baby.

(R. 803-810; 821-836; 860; 868).
Mr. Halliday testified that he did not consider the
$1,500 a gift to the Vigils, that he was not repaid by the
Vigils, and that he would not have paid the money had he known
that they would not receive the baby or that other people were
also trying to adopt the baby (R. 810-811).
Mr. Halliday admitted on cross-examination that his
attorney had informed him that the $1,500 was a charitable
contribution, and that the money did not guarantee that the
10

adoption would go through (R. 815). He testified that he had a
civil suit pending against the Vigils (R. 818).
Mr. Vigil called the Hallidays' attorney on April 6,
1993, and told her that they had not intended to defraud anyone,
but had decided to keep the baby, and would pay back the money.
He also told her that a California couple had just offered to pay
their expenses, and that he had made no commitment to give the
child up for adoption.

(R. 867).

LEGAL ADVICE TO THE VIGILS
Marilyn Fineshriber, the Hallidays' attorney, testified
that she told the Vigils that the money from the Hallidays was a
charitable contribution, and legally could not buy their consent
to the adoption, or obligate them to go through with it.

(R.

848-849; 864) .
John Giffen, the attorney representing Frank Elizondo
and the Vigils, informed all parties that the money from Mr.
Elizondo did not buy the consent to the adoption, but was
considered a charitable contribution.

He gave the Vigils a form

detailing adoption-related crimes under California law, which
indicated that it is a crime to receive pregnancy expenses with
the intent to withhold consent to the adoption.

He testified

that in going over the form he drafted entitled, "Pitfalls of
Adoption," regarding various provisions of California law, he
told the Vigils that it was illegal to accept money from other
couples, and explained that Utah law is similar to California's,
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and counseled them about the vulnerable emotional state of the
prospective adoptive parents.

(R. 930-932; 992).

Mrs. Vigil testified that John Giffen did not go over
the forms with them, or advise them about any legal issues
surrounding adoption, but sent his non-law-trained assistant to
bring the Vigils the forms.

(R. 1121-1122).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A new trial is required because the voir dire in the
instant case did not provide trial counsel with adequate
information with which to assess the prospective jurors. The
trial court's failure to ask the jurors about their fairness and
impartiality, about their independence in deliberations, and
about the impact of their exposure to media concerning attempted
adoptions, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction
which purported to carve out a theft by deception exception from
the statute which requires that all moneys given to birth parents
by prospective adoptive parents be charitable donations.

The

instruction was inconsistent with Utah statutes and cases, and
was prejudicial to Mr. Vigil.
The trial court erred in blocking Mr. Vigil's
presentation of his defense evidence pertinent to his motivation
in seeking out successive prospective adoptive couples. The
court compounded the error by refusing his requested defense
instructions which elucidated his motivation for seeking out
successive prospective adoptive couples.
12

Trial counsel and the trial court prejudiced Mr.
Vigil's defense by failing to give the jurors two jury
instructions established by statute, which would have provided
defenses to Mr. Vigil's actions.
The trial court erred in ruling that charitable
contributions by prospective adoptive parents can be the object
of theft by deception charges.

This Court should resolve this

issue by ordering the case dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

A.

TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE JURY VOIR
DIRE.

The state and federal constitutions require trial
courts insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire
proceedings.

E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6

(Utah 1988)(citing Article I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution), reversed on other grounds. State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).

The Utah Supreme Court has

exercised its supervisory power to reiterate to the trial courts
of this state that it is their responsibility to insure that voir
dire proceedings not only provide adequate information for the
informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate
bias and prejudice from criminal trials.
P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991) .

State v. James, 819

In James, the court directed the

trial courts to go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire
required by federal constitutional standards, to thoroughly
13

detect and probe juror biases to the best of their ability.

Id.

Utah's allegiance to the need for thorough voir dire in criminal
cases has been strong and consistent.

E.g. State v. Worthen, 765

P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 1988); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 10581061 (Utah 1984) .
11

[T] he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of

counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes
and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they
'would not have supported a challenge for cause.'

All that is

necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it
allow 'defense counsel to exercise peremptory challenges more
intelligently.'"

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah

1988) (citation omitted) .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (f) codifies the right to an
impartial jury, and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 18(e) (14)
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are
adequate to reveal juror bias.

The rule provides that a juror

should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a
state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of
the party challenging[.]"
Trial courts are granted broad discretion and carry a
heavy responsibility in conducting voir dire in criminal cases.
E.g. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 501-510 (1991); State
v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991).
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B. THE VOIR DIRE IN THIS CASE WAS INADEQUATE.
After the initial round of voir dire questions, the
trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence, wherein
defense counsel asked the trial court to ask the jurors the
following pre-submitted questions:
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you
came to the conclusion that the prosecution
had not proven the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that
a majority of the jurors believed the
defendant was guilty, would you change your
verdict only because you were in the
minority?
28. Are there any of you who are not in
such a fair and impartial state of mind that
you would not be satisfied to have a juror
possessing your mental state judge the
evidence if you or your loved ones were on
trial here? In other words, would you want
someone with your state of mind sitting as a
juror on a case if you were the defendant?
(R. 709). The trial court declined to give instructions 27 and
28, because the court 4was of the opinion that it had already
conducted sufficient voir dire on those questions (R. 710).
Evaluating the "totality of the questioning," State v.
Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992), this Court can see that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to ask these two questions, because the
voir dire never addressed whether the prospective jurors felt
that they were generally fair and impartial, and whether they
would maintain their independence in the deliberation process, or
succumb to pressure from a majority.
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Defense counsel also requested the trial court to ask
pre-submitted question 10, which stated,

10. Have any of you see [n] any recent
television programs, or received other
information, depicting attempted adoptions?
What did you hear?
Counsel for Mr. Vigil informed the court that two television
programs concerning attempted or failed adoptions had aired
approximately one month and one week prior to the trial (R. 710).
He asked the court to ask the jurors about their exposure to the
programs, and the court agreed to do so (R. 709, 710).
Prospective juror Pepper had seen a program during the week prior
to trial (R. 715). The trial court asked him no follow up
questions, but he had already been stricken for cause.
Prospective juror Jerman had seen a show that winter
(R. 716). When the court asked Jerman if that exposure to that
information would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Mr.
Jerman said that it would not (R. 716). Mr. Jerman had already
been stricken for cause.
Prospective juror Wylie had seen a program somewhere
within six months prior to trial, and had read a magazine article
about the subject (R. 715). Their colloquy was as follows:
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question,
Ms. Wylie. As a result of the documentary or
the article in the magazine, and considering
the nature of today's case, would any of that
information interfere with your
responsibility to be fair and impartial?
MS. WYLIE: No, not really.
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THE COURT: You are certain you could
remain fair and impartial to both sides of
this case?
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes.
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word
"think." Do you have a hesitation?
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in
that detail, you know. I think I can listen
impartially.
(R. 715-716) .
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show
called "Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption
and then their minds were changed and the natural parents got the
child back." (R. 717). She answered "No," when the court asked,
"Would any of that information interfere with your abilities to
be fair and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?" (R. 717).
At an unrecorded bench conference prior to the parties'
passing of the jurors for cause, defense counsel objected to the
trial court's refusal to further interview jurors Wylie and Reese
in chambers regarding what television programs they had seen and
how they felt about them (R. 718, 725). Both Reese and Wylie
served on the Vigils' jury (R. 719) .x

The trial court opined

that the totality of the questions to all prospective jurors was
adequate (R. 726).
Trial counsel was correct in requesting further voir
dire of the jurors.

In State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (1993), a case wherein the

1

Trial counsel was under no obligation to remove them in
order to preserve this issue. It was sufficient to request
additional voir dire, and to obtain a ruling. State v.
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 n.l (Utah App. 1992).
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potential jurors had been victims of crimes similar to those at
issue, this Court stated, "[T] he trial court must adequately
probe a juror's potential bias when that juror's responses or
other facts suggest a potential bias.

The trial court does not

abuse its discretion when, after sufficient questioning, the
suggestion of bias has been dispelled."

id. at 552.

This

rationale applies equally well in the context of this case,
wherein two of the prospective jurors had consumed media which
may have biased them.
This Court has recognized the need for specific voir
dire of prospective jurors who have been exposed to similar media
in the civil arena.

In Doe v. Hafen, cert, granted 789 P.2d 33

(Utah 1989), in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App.
1993); and in Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).

This Court has explained that

once preliminary questioning establishes that jurors have been
exposed to "tort reform propaganda," or media focusing on
insurance reforms, prejudice is established, and the parties are
entitled to more specific questioning to determine if jurors bear
latent or deep-rooted biases as a result of their exposure.
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-459; Barrett, 868 P.2d at 99-101; Evans,
824 P.2d at 464-46.

Given the interests at stake in a criminal

case, trial courts should be required to provide at least as much
voir dire as they are required to provide in the civil arena.
See Hafen at 458 n.2 (intimating that the scope of voir dire in
criminal cases might exceed the scope of civil trial voir dire in
18

order to safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants).
Given that the trial court already knew that two of the
prospective jurors had been exposed to programs focusing on facts
parallel to those involved in the instant case, which the jurors
remembered to some degree, under Hafen, Barrett, and Evans,
prejudice was established and the trial court should have asked
more specific questions to determine if the prospective jurors
bore latent or deep-rooted biases regarding the issues in the
case.

See id.
The trial court's perfunctory questions to prospective

jurors Reese and Wylie about whether, in light of the media
exposure, they felt that they could be fair and impartial to both
sides of the case, were inadequate.

Juror Wylie never gave an

unequivocal response to the trial court's question, but even if
she had, the trial court should have asked more meaningful
questions so that the court and counsel could have assessed the
impact of the media on Ms. Wylie and Ms. Reese.
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not
simply accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a
case fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about
the juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial
court to ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears
latent biases which would impair the juror's performance.

See

State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim
19

of a crime similar to that at issue in the case, an inference of
bias arises, which is not rebutted by a juror's claim that he can
be fair and impartial).

See also State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473,

475 (Utah 1987); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984);
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v.
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981).
As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460
(Utah App, 1991),

fI

[I]t is not enough for a trial judge to ask

questions merely to discover a potential juror's overt biases.
The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear
responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious
attitudes.

Without such an opportunity, the prospect of

impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished."

Id. at 462.

Reviewing the totality of the questioning, this Court
can see that trial counsel was not afforded adequate information
to assess the prospective jurors.

Because the trial court thus

abused its discretion in conducting the voir dire, a new trial is
in order.

See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App.

1992) .
II.

THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW
TRIAL.

A. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT JURIES CORRECTLY.
The law governing jury instructions is that "beyond the
substantive scope, correctness and clarity of the jury
instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court.'

However, said

instructions must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material
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rules of law."

State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah

App.)(citation omitted), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING MR. VIGIL'S
JURY.

Trial counsel objected to the portion emphasized below
in the trial court's jury Instruction No. 28 (R. 1170), which
provides,
INSTRUCTION NO. 28
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or
corporation may pay maternity expenses,
related medical or hospital, and necessary
living expenses of the mother preceding and
during confinement. However, that act of
paying is by law considered an act of charity
and may not be made for the purpose of
inducing the mother, parent or legal guardian
to place the child for adoption, consent to
an adoption, or cooperate in the completion
of an adoption.
Whether a person consents to the
adoption of his or her child is a personal
and private act of that person and may not be
bought or bartered for under the law. A
natural parent at any time may choose not to
consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that
person does not subject himself or herself to
criminal responsibility unless you find from
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt
each and every element of the offense of
Theft by Deception, as charged in the
Informations have been established.
(Emphasis added).
The problem with the emphasized portion of Instruction
No. 28 is that is purports to carve out a theft by deception
exception from the statute which mandates that all monies given
to birth mothers are charitable contributions.
76-7-203 states in relevant part:
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Utah Code Ann. §

Any person, while having custody, care,
control, or possession of any child, who
sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or
dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or
other thing of value is guilty of a felony of
the third degree. However, this section does
not prohibit any person, agency, or
corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity
expenses, related medical or hospital, and
necessary living expenses of the mother
preceding and during confinement as an act of
charity, so long as payment is not made for
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent,
or legal guardian to place the child for
adoption, consent to an adoption, or
cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
There can be no theft by deception in the context of an
adoption, because the property at issue is given to the birth
mother as a charitable contribution, and not as consideration for
her promised performance to consent to the adoption.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-7-203.
Reliance is an essential element of theft by deception.
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982).

Even if the parties

were deceived, there was no theft by deception unless the parties
relied on the Vigils' statements in parting with their money.
Id.

Because the birth parents' consent cannot be bought under

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-203, in giving the birth parents money, the
prospective adoptive parents legally could not rely on the Vigils
to consent to the adoption.

Because the money furnished to birth

parents is characterized as a charitable donation, by definition,
those parting with the money could not be relying on the
receivers to perform.

22

The birth parents cannot purvey any deception, because
the object of their representations, the baby, cannot be sold,
and thus has no pecuniary significance.

See Utah Code Ann. §76-

6-405(2) ("Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary
significance[.]").
Any birth parent aware of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-203
would have a defense to a charge of theft by deception under Utah
Code Ann.§ 76-6-402(3), which provides, "It is a defense under
this part that the actor: (a) Acted under an honest claim of
right to the property or service involved; or (b) Acted in the
honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did[.]"
Under the plain language of Utah law as it currently
stands, the conduct at issue here does not constitute theft by
deception.

In the event that the legislature wishes to make

conduct similar to that alleged here a crime, it may do so by
adopting a statute which makes it a crime to accept charitable
contributions if there is no intent to complete the adoption at
the time of accepting the contributions.

In grafting a theft by

deception exception onto the charitable donation statute, the
trial court invaded the province of the legislature, and violated
the doctrine of separation of powers.

See generally Sutherland,

Statutory Construction, section 46.03 (citations omitted);
Constitution of Utah, Article V Section 1 (separation of powers
provision).
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As trial counsel correctly noted, the last sentence of
Jury Instruction No. 28 is inconsistent with the law governing
theft by deception, and the court erred in giving it to the
jury.2

The instruction is the crux of the State's case, and the

jury's receipt of it was necessarily prejudicial to Mr. Vigil.
III. MR. VIGIL SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE
IN A NEW TRIAL.
A.

TRIAL COURTS MUST ALLOW THE PRESENTATION OF
DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

Every criminal defendant has several federal
constitutional rights to present a complete defense to criminal
charges against him.

See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683

(1985)("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.' ... We break no new ground in

2

Trial counsel's objection should be adequate to
preserve this issue for appeal. To the extent that trial counsel
failed to marshall all of the law pertinent to his objection,
however, this Court nonetheless should address the issue fully,
and may do so under the plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrines. The law governing this issue should have been
plain to both the trial court, and the failure to apply the law
in Mr. Vigil's behalf was clearly prejudicial. Trial counsel's
performance in failing to assert the law constituted objectively
deficient performance, and there is a reasonable likelihood that
the result would have been different had trial counsel properly
asserted the law on his client's behalf. See generally State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah)(discussing plain error doctrine),
cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818,
822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on
allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); discussed
infra.
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observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is
an opportunity to be heard.")(citations omitted).
Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection.

The
An essential

of due process provided by Article I Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution is the "fair opportunity to submit evidence."
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945).

" [T]he

defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his
defense is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our
State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 [.]"
P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981).

State v. Harding, 635

Article I Section 12 of the Utah

Constitution provides numerous trial rights which also pertain.
It states,
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases.
(Emphasis added).
B.

TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY ON DEFENSE
THEORIES.

In selecting instructions for the jury, trial courts
are governed by the axiom that "the defendant has a right to have
his or her theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear
and comprehensible manner."

State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,

205 (Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted) .
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C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING MR. VIGIL'S DEFENSE
EVIDENCE.
Trial counsel for Mr. Vigil called Roland Oliver to
testify about services offered by adoption agencies.

Upon the

state's objection to the relevance of his testimony, trial
counsel argued that the evidence was relevant because, had the
Vigils gone through adoption agencies, rather than through
attorneys Bushman and Giffen, who provided inadequate services,
the Vigils would not have proceeded as they did, in continuing to
seek out prospecting adoptive couples, and accepting expense
monies from three different couples.

The trial court sustained

the relevance objection, and also excluded the evidence under
Rule 403, finding that its admission might confuse and mislead
the jury. (R. 1151-1158).
In this ruling, the trial court forbade Mr. Vigil from
presenting his defense to the crime at issue, and violated the
aforementioned tenets of constitutional law.

The constitutional

provisions prevail, regardless of the rules of evidence
underpinning the trial court's decision.

United States

Constitution, Article VI (supremacy clause); Constitution of
Utah, Article I Section 26 (provisions of Utah Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory, unless expressly declared otherwise).
The trial court's ruling was also erroneous under the rules of
evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence 4 02 provides for the admission
of " [a]11 relevant evidence

...

except as otherwise provided by

the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the
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State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. ..."

Relevant evidence is

defined by Utah Rules of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."
Mr. Vigil's evidence regarding how adoptions should
normally be conducted, in contrast to the performance of
attorneys Bushman and Giffen, goes directly to the absence of the
Vigils' intent to deceive anyone or to wrongfully deprive them of
their property.

By explaining proper adoption procedures through

Mr. Oliver, Mr. Vigil sought to demonstrate that the Vigils'
behavior was caused by the inadequate performance of attorneys
Bushman and Giffen, rather than motivated by any intent to
deceive.
The trial court's exclusion order was also based on
Utah Rules of Evidence 403, which provides,
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah law interpreting this rule demonstrates the error of the
trial court's reasoning.
Under Utah Rules of Evidence 403, courts are to presume
that relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence at issue
falls within a class of evidence known to have "an unusual
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propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead the jury."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993).

In the event

that the evidence fell within such a class, the proponent of the
evidence would then have the burden to show the unusual probative
value of the evidence.

Id.

The evidence which Mr. Vigil sought to introduce would
not have an unusual propensity to "unfairly prejudice, inflame or
mislead the jury," and its admission should be presumed.
Assuming that the burden were on Mr. Vigil to
demonstrate the unusual probative value of the evidence, the
burden would be met in this case.

The State's proof of deception

hinged on the fact that there were multiple prospective couples
involved.

The prosecutor told the jury that had there been only

one couple who tried to adopt the Vigil's baby, the State would
not have prosecuted the Vigils (R. 1175; 13 08).

The basic theory

of the defense was that it was the inadequate performance of
attorneys Giffen and Bushman, rather than an intent to deceive
the three couples, that motivated the Vigils to become involved
with multiple prospective adopting couples (R. 1297-1301) .
There was evidence presented regarding the inadequacies
of the services provided by Giffen and Bushman.

However, the

vast majority of this evidence required legal training to
appreciate.

Mr. Giffin vacillated in his testimony regarding

whether he represented the Vigils or the adoptive couples (R.
929; 941; Defendant's Exhibit 9). Mr. Bushman was initially
contacted to find an adoptive family, but he negotiated to adopt
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the Vigil baby himself, and also presented documents authorizing
him to find another couple to adopt the baby, and negotiated with
another couple to adopt the Vigil baby (R. 756-762; 772-783;
792).

Both attorneys had the Vigils sign vague forms purporting

to waive conflicts of interest.
Exhibit 3).

(Defendant's Exhibit 10; State's

Mr. Bushman provided support money for the Vigils

out of his attorney trust account, and drafted an agreement
whereby the Vigils would have to return the funds if they did not
consent to the adoption, despite the law that the money, by law,
was to be a charitable contribution (R. 779-780).

Mr. Bushman,

who advertised himself as an adoption attorney, indicated that
the idea that the money to the birth parents was a charitable
contribution was "preposterous to [his] mind." (R. 769-770).

Mr.

Giffen acknowledged having had difficulties with the Vigils,
stemming from the way in which he was dispensing the funds, and
because his assistant failed to obtain timely medical care for
Mrs. Vigil when she had a yeast infection. (R. 938-939; 954).
Had the jurors been allowed to hear about proper
adoption procedures from Roland Oliver, this would have clarified
the deficiencies in the attorneys' performances, which the jurors
may not have appreciated, given their lack of legal training.
The evidence would have supported the Vigils' defense that their
motivation in seeking out successive couples was a lack of
satisfaction with the attorneys, rather than a desire to deceive
the prospective couples into parting with their money.
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The trial court's concerns that the evidence might
confuse or mislead the jury underestimate the intelligence of
juries and the importance of giving the jury the information
relevant to deciding the facts in issue.

Juries routinely

address questions of intent and other issues of far greater
complexity than is raised by Roland Oliver's testimony.
Reference to State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App.
1994), demonstrates the error in the trial court's analysis.
Teuscher was charged with homicide for the death of a child which
occurred while the child was in Teuscher's day care facility.

At

trial, her attorney sought to exclude evidence of other uncharged
instances of child abuse involving Teuscher and other children on
other occasions.

The trial court held, and this Court agreed,

that under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b), proof of the other
crimes was entirely appropriate, inasmuch as the homicide charge
to be determined by the jury required the jury's assessment of
issues such as intent, absence of mistake and identity of the
perpetrator.

Jd. at 926-927.

The Teuscher trial court held and this Court agreed
that the evidence was also admissible under rule 403. While
evidence of uncharged crimes is normally considered to be
presumptively prejudicial, State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741
(Utah 1985), both Courts found that the probative value of the
testimony outweighed the danger of prejudice, given the issues to
be determined by the jury.

Teuscher at 928.
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The evidence at issue in Teuscher had a far greater
danger of misleading or confusing the jury than did Mr. Oliver's
testimony in this case.

Unlike the prosecution in Teuscher, Mr.

Vigil has constitutional rights to present his defense, so the
admission of his evidence is more strongly required than that in
Teuscher.
Cross-examination of the state's witnesses was
inadequate to present the defense because Mr. Oliver's testimony
went beyond the proper scope of cross-examination of those
witnesses, and because Mr. Vigil has the right to call witnesses
to support his defense.

Cf. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah

1990)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of trial
counsel in part because counsel failed to call witnesses to
bolster the defendant's testimony).
Because Roland Oliver's testimony was relevant, and
because its probative value exceeded its prejudicial effect, the
trial court should have admitted the evidence.

While cross-

examination of the State's witnesses did present evidence of the
attorneys' shortcomings, a lay jury likely would not appreciate
the significance of the evidence centering on legal
technicalities, such as conflicts of interest.

Given the

scarcity of other evidence available to establish the Vigils'
defense to the intent element of the charges, the trial court's
order excluding Roland Oliver's testimony was prejudicial.3
3

Trial counsel's efforts to present the evidence should
be adequate to preserve this issue for appeal. To the extent
that trial counsel failed to marshall all of the law pertinent to
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D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE MR.
VIGIL'S DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS.

Over trial counsel's objection, the trial court refused
to give the jury requested defense Instruction Nos. 8 and 9,
which quote portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct

(R. 1169).

The requested instructions were

as follow:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will
not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after
consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
the issue, however, this Court nonetheless should address the
issue fully, and may do so under the plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrines. The law governing this issue
should have been plain to the trial court, and the failure to
apply the law in Mr. Vigil's behalf was clearly prejudicial.
Trial counsel's performance in failing to assert the law
constituted objectively deficient performance, and there is a
reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different
had trial counsel properly asserted the law on his client's
behalf. See generally State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29
(Utah)(discussing plain error doctrine), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
62 (1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah
App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on allegations of
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel), cert.
granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); discussed infra.
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(2) the client consents after
consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single
matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of
the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
(R. 295)
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a
business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory,
security or other pecuniary interest adverse
to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms
on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to
the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the
client[;]
(2) the client is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the
advi[c]e of independent counsel in
the transaction[;] and
(3) the client consents in
writing thereto.
(R. 296)
As was discussed above, Mr. Vigil was entitled to have
the jury instructed on his theory of the defense.

Requested

Instructions No. 8 and 9 would have assisted defense counsel in
elucidating the shortcomings in the performances of the attorneys
Giffen and Bushman, and thus in explaining why the Vigils sought
out successive prospective adoptive couples.

Particularly in

light of the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of
Roland Oliver to explain acceptable norms in adoption
proceedings, the absence of the requested jury instructions
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pertaining to the attorneys' deficient performances was
prejudicial.
IV.

THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
TWO ASPECTS OF MR. VIGIL'S DEFENSE.

Given that Utah law mandates that monies given to birth
parents by prospective adoptive parents are to be charitable
contributions or gifts, and that attorneys John Giffen and
Marilyn Fineshriber advised the Vigils that the money from the
prospective adoptive couples was legally considered to be a
charitable contribution, the Vigils were entitled to an
instruction embodying the law set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-64 02.

It provides, in relevant part,
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that
the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest
claim of right to the property or
service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief
that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property
or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised
control over the property or
service honestly believing that the
owner, if present, would have
consented.
While John Giffen testified that he told the Vigils

that it was illegal to accept money from more than one couple,
this discussion occurred in the context of their going over a
form embodying California Law.

See State's Exhibit 10.

Mr.

Giffen testified that he told the Vigils that Utah law was
similar to California's.

Mrs. Vigil denied the Vigils' ever
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discussing any such legal concept with Mr. Giffen, and Mr. Vigil
did not testify at all.
The jury also should have been instructed that
"Theft by deception does not occur ... when there is only falsity
as to matters having no pecuniary significance[.]" Utah Code
Arm.§ 76-6-405(2) .
It was the state's theory that the Vigils deceived the
Bushmans, the Hallidays, and the Elizondos in falsely
representing their intent to give up the Vigils' baby for
adoption (R. 7-8; 171-172).

For instance, the probable cause

statement originally filed in case number 931901605 provides, in
relevant part, "The Defendants received money from three
different couples for the baby and yet never delivered the child
to anyone." (R. 172). As a matter of law, these representations
could have no pecuniary significance.

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-203.

B. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE ERRORS.
While trial counsel did not request the defense
instructions, this Court should nonetheless address and rectify
the errors, under the plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrines.
Under the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate for
an appellate court to address an issue raised for the first time
on appeal if the error should have been obvious to the trial
court and was prejudicial.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29

(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).

Some errors will be

addressed on appeal even if they should not have been plain to
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the trial court, if, in hindsight, the appellate Court recognizes
a high level of prejudice stemming from the error.
at 35 and n.8.

Id., 773 P.2d

The plain error standard is not to be applied in

an overly technical fashion; the rule is designed to balance the
need for procedural regularity against the need for fairness.
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989).
The two statutes at issue here should have been plain
to the trial court.

The statute limiting theft by deception to

representations of pecuniary significance is the same statute
which defines theft by deception.

The statute setting forth the

good faith defenses to the charges is located under the same part
of the code as the theft by deception statute.

The language of

the statutes is plain and unambiguous, and directly supports the
defense that both attorneys for the Vigils were attempting to
assert through motions to quash the bindovers, motions to
dismiss, and arguments to the jury.
The absence of the defense instructions was
prejudicial.

There were no true defense instructions given, and

given the evidence in this case, there is a substantial
likelihood of a more favorable outcome, had the proper
instructions been given.
This Court should therefore address the absence of the
instructions under the plain error doctrine.

See State v.

Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard
for reversal on allegations of plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
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"In order to bring a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show [1]
that trial counsel's performance was
deficient in that it 'fell below an objective
standard or reasonableness,' and [2] that the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome
of the trial."
State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.)(citations
omitted), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

The

prejudice prong is established if there is a "'reasonable
probability' that, but for counsel's errors, the result would
have been different."

Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d 136,

138 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted).
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal, the trial record must be sufficient for
the court to decide the issue, and the defendant must be
represented by counsel different from trial counsel.

Id. at 822

n4.
Just as the need for the defense instructions should
have been obvious to the trial court, the need also should have
been obvious to trial counsel.

The failure to request the

instructions cannot be based upon any conceivable tactical
decision, and fell below objective standards of reasonableness.
Given the absence of any true defense instructions, and given the
evidence in this case, trial counsel's failure to request the
instructions was also prejudicial.

See State v. Moritzkyf 771

P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) (conviction reversed for
ineffective assistance of counsel, who requested defense
instruction that failed to incorporate recent statute beneficial
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to the defense; court found no conceivable tactical basis for the
omission); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d 136 (Utah App.
1994)(conviction reversed because trial counsel failed to request
defense instruction authorized by the code).
V.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
CANNOT BE THE OBJECT OF THEFT BY DECEPTION.

As trial counsel argued this to the trial court (e.g.
R. 1052-1053), charitable contributions may not be the object of
theft by deception.4
Theft by deception is defined by Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6405, which states,
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises control over property of another
by deception and with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
4

Trial counsel's motions to quash the bindover orders
and to dismiss the case should be adequate to preserve this issue
for appeal. To the extent that trial counsel failed to marshall
all of the law pertinent to the issue, however, this Court should
nonetheless address the issue fully, and may do so under the
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. The
law governing this issue should have been plain to the trial
court, and the failure to apply the law in Mr. Vigil's behalf was
clearly prejudicial. Trial counsel's performance in failing to
assert the law constituted objectively deficient performance, and
there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
different had trial counsel properly asserted the law on his
client's behalf. See generally State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29
(Utah)(discussing plain error doctrine), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct.
62 (1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah
App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on allegations of
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel), cert.
granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); discussed supra.
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of wares or worth in communications addressed
to the public or to a class or group.
By the plain language of the statute, theft by
deception does not occur when the matters which are the subject
of the deception have no pecuniary significance.

Under Utah Code

Ann.§ 76-7-203, consent to adopt can have no pecuniary
significance.

The statute states,

Any person, while having custody, care,
control, or possession of any child, who
sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or
dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or
other thing of value is guilty of a felony of
the third degree. However, this section does
not prohibit any person, agency, or
corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity
expenses, related medical or hospital, and
necessary living expenses of the mother
preceding and during confinement as an act of
charity, so long as payment is not made for
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent,
or legal guardian to place the child for
adoption, consent to an adoption, or
cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
An element of the offense of theft by deception is
reliance by the victims.
1982).

State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah

Because the victims in the context of an adoption cannot

rely on the birth parents to consent to the adoption, Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-7-203, their is no reliance causing them to part with
their money, and theft by deception cannot occur. Jones.
The statute characterizing monies from prospective
adoptive parents as charitable contributions, Utah Code Ann. §767-203, would also provide a basis for the statutory good faith
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defenses to theft by deception provided in Utah Code Ann.§ 76-64 02(3).

That statute provides,
(3) It is a defense under this part that
the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest
claim of right to the property or
service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief
that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property
or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised
control over the property or
service honestly believing that the
owner, if present, would have
consented.
Because the facts at issue here cannot constitute the

crime of theft by deception under Utah law, this Court should
order this case dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Vigil requests that this case be dismissed.

In the

alternative, he seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and he is allowed to
present his full defense.

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Mr. Vigil
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ADDENDUM 1
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 10
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction,
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
preliminary examination, the function of the
examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 26
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are
declared to be otherwise.

Constitution of Utah, Article V Section 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise
any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

United States Constitution, Article VI
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into,
before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as
valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the constitution of Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by
Oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but
no religious Test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-401
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including
real estate, tangible and intangible personal property,
captured or domestic animals and birds, written
instruments or other writings representing or embodying
rights concerning real or personal property, labor,
services, or otherwise containing anything of value to
the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or
water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any
portion of any scientific or technical information,
design, process, procedure, formula or invention which
the owner thereof intends to be available only to
persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to
bring about a transfer of possession or of some other
legally recognized interest in property, whether to the
obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services,
to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a
trade secret to make any facsimile, replica,
photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious obj ect:
(a) To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation; or

(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control"
means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by
trespassory taking, larceny be conversion, larceny by
bailee, and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of law or fact that is
false and that the actor does not believe to
be true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression
of law or fact that the actor previously
created or confirmed by words or conduct that
is likely to affect the judgment of another
and that the actor does not now believe to be
true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring
information likely to affect his judgment in
the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or
encumbers property without disclosing a lien,
security interest, adverse claim, or other
legal impediment to the enjoyment of the
property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim or impediment is or is not
valid or is or is not a matter of official
record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely
to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor does
not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed; provided, however, that failure to
perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not
intend to perform or knew the promise would
not be performed.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-402
The following presumption shall be applicable to
this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part, that the
actor has an interest in the property or service stolen
if another person also has an interest that the actor

is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in
property for purposes of this subsection shall not
include a security interest for the repayment of a debt
or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the
actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right
to the property or service involved; or
.(b) Acted in the honest belief that he
had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over
the property or service honestly believing
that the owner, if present, would have
consented.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-405
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by deception
and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however,
when there is only falsity as to matters having no
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group
addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
of wares or worth in communications addressed to the
public or to a class or group.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-7-203
Any person, while having custody, care, control,
or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of,
or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
However, this section does not prohibit any person,
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of
the mother preceding and during confinement as an act
of charity, so long as payment is not made for the
purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an
adoption.
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by
counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed
against him;

(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district where the offense is alleged
to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if
the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when
received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has ben
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by
a magistrate.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus
such an additional number as will allow for all
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made,
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause.
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
thereon is peremptory challenge to one juror at a time
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury,
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the
jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or
may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to

supplement the examination by such further inquiry as
it deems proper, or may itself submit to the
prospective jurors additional questions requested by
counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an
individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called
to serve at a particular court or for the
trial of a particular action. A challenge to
the panel is an objection made to all jurors
summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel
can be founded only on a material
departure from the procedure
prescribed with respect to the
selection, drawing, summoning and
return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the
panel shall be taken before the
jury is sworn and shall be in
writing or recorded by the
reporter. It shall specifically
set forth the facts constituting
the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the
panel is opposed by the adverse
party, a hearing may be had to try
any question of fact upon which the
challenge is based. The jurors
challenged, and any other persons,
may be called as witnesses at the
hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide
the challenge. If the challenge to
the panel is allowed, the court
shall discharge the jury so far as
the trial in question is concerned.
If a challenge is denied, the court
shall direct the selection of the
jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror
may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made
only before the jury is sworn to try the
action, except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn
but before any of the evidence is presented.
In challenges for cause the rules relating to
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon
shall apply. All challenges for cause shall
be taken first by the prosecution and then by
the defense.

(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a
juror for which no reason need be given. In capital
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled
to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases,
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges.
If there is more than one defendant the court may allow
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(1) want of any of the
qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity
which renders one incapable of performing the
duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree to the person alleged to be
injured by the offense charged, or on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any party,
witness or person alleged to have been
victimized or injured by the defendant, which
relationship when viewed objectively, would
suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be
free of favoritism. A prospective juror
shall not be disqualified solely because he
is indebted or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party
adverse to the defendant in a civil action,
or having complained against or having been
accused by him in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the particular
offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally
sworn to try the same charge, and whose
verdict was set aside, or which was
discharged without a verdict after the case
was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil
action brought against the defendant for the
act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is
punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death

penalty as would preclude the juror from
voting to impose the death penalty following
conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year
preceding, has been engaged or interested in
carrying on any business, calling or
employment, the carrying on of which is a
violation of law, where defendant is charged
with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness,
either for or against the defendant on the
preliminary examination or before the grand
jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged;
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
(f) peremptory challenges shall be taken first by
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately.
Challenges for cause shall be completed before
peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
The prosecution and defense shall each have one
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate
juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same
privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror
is a privilege of the person exempted and is not a
ground for challenge for cause.

(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and
each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict
according to the evidence and the instructions of the
court.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party
may file written request that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the
same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to
the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of
its proposed action upon the request; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive
this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and
part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by
the endorsement what part of the charge was given and
what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's
failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in
the case, and if the court refers to any of the
evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unless
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for
argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 01
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having nay
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than in would be without the
evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 02
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,

statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 03
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

ADDENDUM 2
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.
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Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation may pay
maternity expenses, related medical or hospital, and necessary
living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement.
However, that act of paying is by law considered an act of charity
and may not be made for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent,
or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or her child
is a personal and private act of that person and may not be bought
or bartered for under the law.

A natural parent at any time may

choose not to consent to an adoption.

By so choosing, that person

does not subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility
unless you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt
each and every element of the offense of Theft by Deception, as
charged in the Informations have been established.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another
client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person,
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.

When

representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of
the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

3_

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory,
security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by
the client:
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to
seek the advise of independent counsel in the transaction:
and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.

r
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ADDENDUM 3
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED VOIR DIRE
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Third Judi «ul District
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, (#5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS M. VIGIL,

Case No. 931901605FS
and 931901607FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant.

The defendant, THOMAS M. VIGIL, respectfully submits the
following interrogatories for the voir dire of the prospective
jurors in the above-numbered case.

QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY PANEL
1.
2.

What is your educational background?
What is your profession and the profession of your

spouse?
3.

Have you ever, in any capacity, been involved in the

adoption of a child?
4.

What was your experience?

Do you have

any

strong

feelings or opinions about

adoption?
5.

Do you have children?

If so:

State the age of each of these children.
6.

Do you belong to any organizations dealing with victim

nrma

support groups?
7.

Have you been involved with any groups whose goals are to

make changes in the criminal justice system?

If so, what group?

8.

What is your main source of news?

9.

Have any of you heard about this case? What did you hear

and where did you hear it?
10.

Have any of you see any recent television programs, or

received other information, depicting attempted adoptions?

What

did you hear?
11.

Do any of you know the prosecutor in this case?

12.

Do any of you know any of the State's witnesses?

13.

Do any of you know Mr. Vigil or Mrs. Vigil?

14.

Do any of you know Mr. Vigil's attorney?

15.

Have any of you, your close friends or relatives, ever

been employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office or any
other law enforcement agency?

If so:

What was the nature of the employment?
When were you so employed?
16.

The defendant may or may not be a witness in this case.

Would you be able to weigh the defendant's testimony the same as
any other witness?
17.

Are there any of you who would tend to give more

credibility to the testimony of a police officer, merely because he
or she is a police officer, than you would to any other witness?
18.

Have you lived in any place other than Salt Lake County

for any length of time?

If so:
2
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How long have

:;. , 4 >-** ; - \ * ;.<ske County?

Where did : u u live Dei
decide t^ .
ive *:*•> : * ••
for

,,.*!.-

here?
^

i„* Lake County?

,*. friends, or* relatives worked

, correctional lac

.jency?

io vnn feavo elatives .

c friends who are,

been, law enforcement officers?
before „" I I
so:
What type of case was it?
When.'
Would that experience affect your ability to serve 011
this jury in a fair and impartial manner?

22.

Have a.- of you or your close friends ti. relatives ever

been th& victim OJ. a criminal «, fferise"11

I!

What w*<= t b c nature of the offense?
Was

anybody

You

will

charged,

arrested

c- convicted

of that

offense?
23

later

be

instructed

protection or presumptions i n the 1 aw.
:i i i fa \ ci : : 'f Mr

I|;

i :i g i 3 a,,i id Mi :s

concerning

certain

In this case, those are all

V i ji 3 „, tt le accused.

Are there any

of you who believe that our system has gone too far, and that the
person

24.

charged

crime

has too many

protect!

r

Does the mere fact that Mr,, Vjigiii dnti Mis. Vigil is
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charged with an offense in the Information cause any of you to
believe that they are probably guilty as charged?
25.

You will be instructed that an individual accused of a

crime is presume to be innocent. Do any of you feel that Mr. Vigil
and Mrs. Vigil have a burden to prove innocence?
26.

Do you understand that Mr. Vigil and Mrs. Vigil have no

obligation to testify? Do any of you nevertheless feel they should
come forward and testify?
27.

If,

after

hearing

the

evidence,

you

came

to

the

conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that a majority of
the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would you change your
verdict only because you were in the minority?
28.

Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and

impartial state of mind that you would not be satisfied to have a
juror possessing your mental state judge the evidence if you or
your loved ones were on trial here? In other words, would you want
someone with your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you
were the defendant?
29.

Do any of you, for whatever reason, have such strong

feelings about the crime of Theft by Deception or about this case
that your judgment in this case might be affected?
30.

Do any of you have any problems with your hearing, sight

or any other medical problem which would impair your ability -to
devote full attention to this trial?
31.

Is there anything occurring in your life at the present
4
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time that would prevent you from giving your full attention Lw u u s
case?
DATED this

-3

day of April, 1994.

(

/

) cz^T'C^r^U C^<

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defend

MAILED/DELIVERED a cop^ - ' the foregoing to tin1 nff k v of II i
* !i Mint y A L U
this

S

"outh, Salt Lake Ci t y , Utah

84111

day :;* April, 1994.
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